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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is brought pursuant to the provisions of 
Article VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the Utah Constitution and 
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Mr. Conger appeals from the Third Judicial District 
Court's entry of Summary Judgment in favor of Tel-Tech and from 
that Court's Order denying Mr. Conger's Motion to Amend and/or 
for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rules 59(a)(7) and 
60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Do genuine issues of material fact exist with respect 
to the question of whether Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger a duty?1 
II. Did the District Court correctly rule that Tel-Tech 
did not owe Mr. Conger a duty.2 
III. Assuming that the District Court erred in holding that 
no duty existed, was it harmless error.3 
*Mr. Conger's statement of the first issue presumes the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact on the question of 
whether Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger a duty and then asks whether 
the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in the 
face of those factual issues. A much fairer and more 
applicable statement of the issue would ask whether any factual 
disputes exist which, when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, (1) must be resolved before the District Court 
can correctly assess the existence of a duty, or (2) show that 
a duty in fact existed. 
2See Id. 
3Mr. Conger states the second issue in such a way that it 
presumes the existence of a duty and then asks whether the 
District Court correctly ruled that the duty was not breached. 
In fact, the District Court never reached the question of 
whether such a duty had been breached because it held that no 
such duty existed. Thus, the issue of whether Tel-Tech 
breached a duty has yet to be placed squarely before the 
court. Tel-Tech contends, however, that if the District Court 
incorrectly ruled that Tel-Tech did not owe Mr. Conger a duty, 
that error was harmless based on the record. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On January 1, 1981, Mr. Conger fell from the top of a 
stainless steel milk tanker on which he had been walking. On 
September 13, 1982, Mr. Conger filed an action seeking damages 
for personal injuries sustained in the fall against Tel-Tech, 
Inc., and others. The action against Tel-Tech alleged that 
Tel-Tech was negligent in its installation of cleaning equip-
ment inside the tanker in that Tel-Tech failed to install walk 
protection on the top of the tanker and failed to warn of the 
necessity of such walk protection. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On July 23, 1984, Tel-Tech filed a Motion For Summary 
Judgment on the grounds that (1) Tel-Tech owed no duty to warn 
Meadow Gold, (2) if Tel-Tech owed a duty to warn, that duty was 
discharged by Meadow Gold's knowledge of the hazard and (3) 
Tel-Tech did not owe Mr. Conger any duty to judge the adequacy 
of Meadow Gold's directions. (R. 185-186, 189-200.) 
C. Disposition Below 
On September 20, 1984, Judge Daniels filed a Memorandum 
Decision granting Tel-Tech's Motion For Summary Judgment. 
Judge Daniels addressed the question of whether one who installs 
equipment has a duty to install, or at least recommend, addi-
tional safety devices which make the equipment safer to use in 
various applications. (R. 349-353.) Judge Daniels concluded 
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that the "contractor should be allowed to perform the work he 
is asked to perform without imposing a duty upon him to investi-
gate the uses to which an owner will put the equipment. So 
long as he performs his work in a workmanlike way and his work 
does not cause the equipment to be dangerous, he should not be 
held liable if the owner applies the equipment in a dangerous 
way. The duty is upon the owner to use the equipment safely. 
If he does not, then he, not the independent contractor, is 
responsible." (R. 349-353.) 
On November 6, 1984, Mr. Conger filed a Motion to Amend 
and/or for Relief from Judgment Granting Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rules 59(a)(7) and 60(b)(7), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 371-372.) In his Motion, Mr. 
Conger argued that the case of DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 
P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), which plaintiff had failed previously to 
locate in opposing Tel-Tech's Motion for Summary Judgment, was 
dispositive on the question of duty in Mr. Conger's favor. (R. 
366-370.) Tel-Tech opposed Mr. Conger's Motion on several 
grounds (R. 376-383), and on November 30, 1984, Judge Daniels 
denied Mr. Conger's Motion. (R. 385-386.) 
Mr. Conger voluntarily dismissed his claims against Western 
General Dairy, Inc. and settled with Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. 
and Scott Wetzel Company. (Appellant's Brief, p. i.) The 
District Court ordered those claims dismissed on January 12, 
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1987 and Mr. Conger filed a Notice of Appeal on February 4, 
1987. (R. 622-626.) 
D« Statement of Facts 
1. On January 1, 1981, while employed by Beatrice Foods 
Company, Meadow Gold Division ("Meadow Gold"), appellant Robert 
E. Conger ("Mr. Conger") was attempting to clean a stainless 
steel milk tank trailer. He slipped and fell off the top of 
the trailer, sustaining serious personal injuries. (R. 156-157.) 
2* Mr. Conger's Second Amended Complaint alleged that 
approximately twenty months before Mr. Conger's fall, Tel-Tech 
"made certain modifications to said tank trailer, which include 
the installation of clean-out valves on the top of the tank," 
and that Tel-Tech "negligently failed to install walk protec-
tion to the clean out valves and negligently failed to warn and 
advise of the necessity of such walk protection." (R. 156.) 
3* The Meadow Gold Division of Beatrice Foods Co., plain-
tiff's employer, purchased the milk tanker at issue in this case 
in March of 1979; two months later, in May of 1979, Tel-Tech 
installed the two spray ball stations on the top of the tanker. 
(Index 640; deposition of Donald Dvorak, pp. 10-11, 32.) 
4. , Tel-Tech is engaged in the business of selling chemi-
cals, stainless steel machinery and certain services to the 
dairy industry. (Index 636; Depo. of Randy Telford, pp. 3-6; 
Index 633; Depo. of Leonard Telford, pp. 3-7.) Tel-Tech has the 
ability to install spray ball stations on milk tankers. A 
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spray ball consists of a piece of stainless steel tubing 
inserted through the skin and shell into the tanker itself and 
welded into place- It is sealed off by a hex nut ferrule when 
not in use. The station is used as a port through which a 
chemical solution and rinsing water are pumped into the tanker 
in connection with the cleaning of the tanker's inside. It 
derives its name from the actual device through which the 
solution and water flow. A small spray ball is attached to a 
tube, which is connected to the hose accessing the chemical 
solution in water. As the liquids are pumped through the ball, 
it sprays them systematically throughout the entire inside of 
the tanker. (Index 633; Depo. of Leonard Telford, pp. 9, 24.) 
5. The milk tanker at issue in this case required two 
spray ball stations; without them, it could only be cleaned 
manually by a Meadow Gold or Western General employee, who is 
required to enter the inside of the tanker and brush on the 
chemical solution and rinsing water. (Index 633; Depo. of 
Leonard Telford, pp. 8-9.) 
6. Once the spray ball stations were installed on the 
tanker, the operator or other employee responsible for cleaning 
the tanker was only required to remove the hex nut ferrule and 
connect the tube to a hose. There were at least three possible 
ways of making this connection: (1) the employee could climb 
on top of the tanker using a ladder which is permanently 
affixed to the tanker; this, however, would require that he 
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walk several feet on the stainless steel crown to the spray 
ball station; (2) he could use a portable ladder and station it 
immediately under the spray ball station, thereby eliminating 
the necessity of walking on the tanker (Index 636; Depo. of 
Randy Telford, pp. 22-24; Index 637; Depo. of Robert E. Conger, 
p. 107); or (3) a number of dairies including the Western 
General facility, have a portable, swinging walkway mounted 
above the tanker cleaning bay so that it can be lowered 
directly onto the crown near the spray ball station. (Index 
633; Depo. of Leonard Telford, p. 21; Index 638; Depo. of Vern 
Thurgood, pp. 13-15, 18, 27, 33-34.) At the time Tel-Tech 
installed the spray ball stations on the Meadow Gold tanker, 
Meadow Gold had an arrangement with Western General for the use 
of Western General's facilities to clean its tankers; Meadow 
Gold paid Western General for this service. (Index 640; Depo. 
of Donald Dvorak, pp. 17-18.) 
7. On May 7, 1979, Tel-Tech installed the two spray ball 
stations. Tel-Tech billed Meadow Gold $170.00 plus tax for the 
spray ball stations, which included their installation. Prior 
to their installation, employees at Tel-Tech discussed the 
matter with Ronald Dvorak, who is Meadow Gold's local transpor-
tation manager. (Index 640; Depo. of Donald Dvorak, pp. 4, 8, 
14, 19.) Mr. Dvorak and the Tel-Tech employees never discussed 
anything other than the installation of the spray ball 
stations; specifically, Mr. Dvorak never instructed Tel-Tech to 
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install walkway protection from the stationary ladder to the 
individual spray ball stations. (Index 640; Depo. of Donald 
Dvorak, pp. 19-21.) 
8. Tel-Tech faithfully performed the services which 
Meadow Gold requested, i.e., installation of the two spray ball 
stations. No evidence exists in the record that Meadow Gold 
ever complained that the work performed by Tel-Tech was defec-
tive, or that the spray ball stations did not adequately per-
form the function for which they were intended: the cleaning 
and rinsing of the inside of the tanker. Meadow Gold accepted 
Tel-Tech's services and paid the $178.50 statement in full. 
(Index 640; Depo. of Donald Dvorak, Exhibit 2.) 
9. Tel-Tech is not in the business of designing, manufac-
turing or selling safety features on milk tankers. Tel-Tech is 
not in a position to supply materials which could be used as 
walkway protection. Tel-Tech simply does not have the techni-
cal capabilities to design, manufacture and sell safety walkway 
protection. (Index 633; Depo. of Leonard Telford, pp. 20-26, 
42; Index 636; Depo. of Randy Telford, pp. 11-12, 21-23.) 
Tel-Tech has never held itself out as having knowledge or 
experience with respect to safety features on milk tankers. 
Tel-Tech has never been asked to install such safety features 
and has never been consulted or asked to consult with respect 
to such safety features. (.Id.; Index 638; Depo. of Vern 
Thurgood, pp. 36-37.) 
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10. Mr. Donald Dvorak was in charge of the transportation 
in Salt Lake City for Beatrice Foods Company, Meadow Gold 
Division, at the time Meadow Gold requested that Tel-Tech 
install the spray balls. (Index 640; Depo. of Donald Dvorak, 
p.4.) In his deposition, he testified as follows: 
Question: " . . . Do you recall being aware of the 
kinds of walk protection that were available for milk 
tankers during this period that you were in that job?" 
Answer: "I was familiar with the need for those 
things. . . ." 
Question: "What I'm getting at is who made the phone 
call or whatever to Tel-Tech, and said we'd like you 
to do this work?" 
Answer: "Well, I made the phone call and asked 
Tel-Tech to install the spray ball. . . . " 
Question: " . . . Now, did you have any conversation 
with Tel-Tech about putting in walk protection from 
the ladder or the ports back to the spray ball 
assemblies?" 
Answer: "No." 
Question: "To your knowledge was any kind of walk 
protection ever installed between the spray ball 
assemblies and the ports on the top of the trailer?" 
Answer: "I don't know." 
Question: "Did you ever give any thought to having 
that done?" 
Answer: "Yes." 
Question: "Do you remember when?" 
Answer: "Well, at the time of all this. I was 
actually gone when this job was completed." 
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Question: "Well, what I'm getting at, you said you 
had given some thought to putting walk protection on 
it. Can you tell me when you had those thoughts?" 
Answer: "I don't recall." 
Question: "What did you do about implementing that 
thought, if anything?" 
Answer: "I didn't do anything about it." 
(Index 640; Depo. of Donald Dvorak, pp. 14, 18-20.) 
11. In his deposition, Mr. Conger testified that he had 
driven that particular truck and tanker approximately 500 times 
prior to the accident. He estimated that he had been driving 
the tanker some fifteen to sixteen months prior to his accident 
and that he had been driving the tanker some six months before 
the spray balls were installed. (Index 637; Depo. of Robert E. 
Conger, pp. 41-43, 51.) As part of his duties in driving the 
tanker, he was required to clean it out once he was finished 
delivering the load. (Index 637; Depo. of Robert E. Conger, 
pp. 51-52.) With respect to walk protection on the tanker in 
question, Mr. Conger testified as follows: 
Question: "Now you say you talked to other drivers 
about the fact that there wasn't any walk protection 
on the top of this tanker?" 
Answer: "Yes." 
Question: "This is before your accident, is that 
right?" 
Answer: "Yes." 
Question: "Who did you talk to?" 
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Answer: "Just general conversations between the 
drivers." 
Question: "Why did you think there should have been?" 
Answer: "Well, because it's just too slick to stand 
up there." 
Question: "Before your accident, had you ever been on 
top of that tanker when it was too slick to stand in 
the area between the hatch and spray ball?" 
Answer: "No." 
Question: "How did you know it was too slick to stand 
if you had never had that experience personally?" 
Answer: "Well, I was putting theory together, you 
know, walking on top of stainless steel and the least 
little bit of moisture." 
Question: "Did you do anything to inform your super-
visor or anybody else at Meadow Gold or Beatrice about 
your concerns about there being no walk protection up 
there?" 
Answer: "Yes, I did." 
Question: "Who did you talk to, and what did you do 
and when was that?" 
Answer: "Well, I mentioned it to Mike Keating and I 
mentioned it to Pierce Petersen which was my 
supervisor in Orem." 
Question: " . . . What was Mr. Keating's position, if 
you know?" 
Answer: "He was plant superintendent in Salt Lake." 
-10-
Question: "Let's start with Mr. Keating. Do you 
remember when you told him about your concern?" 
Answer: "Oh it was a couple of months after they put 
the balls in." 
Question: "Do you remember specifically what you told 
him?" 
Answer: "I just asked him if he didn't think that 
there should be some walk protection up there." 
Question: "Did you ask him about why there wasn't walk 
protection there or did you specifically request, 
'Hey, put some walk protection up that.'?" 
Answer: "No, I just - I just asked him if he thought 
maybe we ought to have some up there." 
Question: "What did he say?" 
Answer: "He said, 'I'll look into it.'" 
Question: "At the time of this conversation with Mr. 
Keating, did Meadow Gold or Beatrice have any kind of 
a procedure where if you had a complaint or suggestion 
you could write it down, submit it in the form of a 
written request?" 
Answer: "Yes, they had reports that we turned in 
periodically or daily." 
Question: "Did you ever include your complaint about 
the walk protection on one of these reports?" 
Answer: "Yes." 
Question: "When was that?" 
Answer: "Oh, I couldn't give you a date." 
Question: "Would it have been about the same time as 
this conversation with Mr. Keating, or before or 
after?" 
Answer: "Probably after." 
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Question: "How many times did you submit a written 
report where you asked or requested something about 
the walk protection?" 
Answer: MI think it was just a few times for that 
particular item.M 
Question: "Did Mr. Keating ever get back with you to 
tell you he had followed up on your suggestion about 
the walk protection?" 
Answer: "No." 
Question: "Did you ever go back to him and say, 'Mike 
what did you decide about the walk protection* or 
words to that effect?" 
Answer: "No." 
Question: "Why not?" 
Answer: "Just didn't do anything about it." 
Question: "How about the conversations with Mr. 
Petersen concerning the walk protection; do you recall 
when that took place, the first one, let's say?" 
Answer: "It was probably in the spring because he was 
transferred up here in June so it would have to be 
after the balls was put in and before he was trans-
ferred up here because it was in Orem." 
Question: "Spring of 1980?" 
Answer: "Yes." 
Question: "Do you remember what you said to him about 
the walk protection?" 
Answer: "I just asked him if he could see if we could 
get some." 
Question: "What did he say?" 
Answer: "He said he would look into it." 
Question: "Do you know if he ever did?" 
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Answer: "I don't know if he ever did or not. He was 
transferred up here." 
Question: "Mr. Conger, I asked you several questions 
about these reports that you submitted where you wrote 
down apparently a suggestion or something about the 
walk protection. What specifically did you put in the 
report?" 
Answer: "I just said I thought that it needed it." 
Question: "When you say it, did you recommend 
something specific like grit strips, or catwalks or 
what specifically did you recommend?" 
Answer: "Just walk protection." 
(Index 637; Depo. of Robert E. Conger, pp. 66-76.) 
12. Prior to the installation of the spray balls on the 
tanker in this action, Tel-Tech had consulted in the installa-
tion of spray balls on dairy tankers on five or six occasions 
but had never done the installation itself. (Index 633; Depo. 
of Leonard Telford, pp. 9-10, 15-17.) 
13. In opposition to Tel-Tech's Motion For Summary Judg-
ment, Mr. Conger submitted the Affidavit of Carl Eilers. Mr. 
Eilers set forth his extensive involvement and experience with 
liquid food and chemical tankers. He set forth his experience 
with respect to installation of spray balls and explained that 
in each case he had recommended some form of walk protection. 
He also stated that it was foreseeable that the addition of 
spray balls will result in persons walking along the top of the 
tanker. In his view, Tel-Tech should have installed or at 
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least recomended to Meadow Gold the installation of walk protec-
tion at the time Tel-Tech installed the spray balls. (R. 
234-237.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court correctly held that Tel-Tech owed Mr. 
Conger no duty. The District Court recognized that the exis-
tence of a duty is a question to be determined by the court 
based on the facts before it viewed in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff. Where the District Court viewed the facts 
before it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in deter-
mining the existence or non-existence of a duty, no genuine 
issue of material fact exists. 
Furthermore, the facts viewed in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff show that Tel-Tech was under no duty to warn 
Meadow Gold or Mr. Conger of the hazard of walking on the crown 
of a stainless steel tanker trailer that had no walkway protec-
tion or of the need for walkway protection. The spray balls 
themselves presented no danger. Other reasonable means of 
access to the spray balls than walking on the crown existed and 
Tel-Tech could reasonably assume that Mr. Conger and his 
employer would access them in a non-negligent manner. Addition-
ally, the hazard was open and obvious and it was not necessary 
for Tel-Tech to warn of a condition which a mere casual obser-
vance would and did disclose. Tel-Tech was directed simply to 
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install two cleaning devices and was not directed to install 
walkway protection. Tel-Tech should not be legally obligated 
to judge the adequacies of Meadow Gold's direction. 
Finally, even assuming that the District Court erred in 
finding that Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger no duty, the error was 
harmless. The alleged duty consists of a duty to warn of the 
need for walkway protection when walking on the crown of a 
stainless steel tanker trailer. Both Mr. Conger and his 
employer were aware of that need. Therefore, the duty was 
discharged. 
ARGUMENT 
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT RULED CORRECTLY THAT 
TEL-TECH DID NOT OWE MR. CONGER A DUTY. 
A. The Question of the Existence of a Duty was Properly 
Resolved by the District Court. 
1. A Negligence Action may not be Maintained when no Duty 
or Obligation Existed - A negligence action may be maintained 
only if there is a duty or obligation, recognized by law, which 
requires the defendant to conform to a particular standard of 
conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risks 
of harm. See, e.g., Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250, 1253 
(Utah 1979) (citing W. Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971); 
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 (1965)); Gray v. Scott, 565 
P.2d 76, 78 (Utah 1977); Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Bd., 146 
Ariz, 352, 706 P.2d 364, 366 (1985). 
As Dean Prosser explained, a duty in negligence cases is 
defined as an obligation to which the law gives recognition and 
effect to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward 
another. W. Prosser & W. Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts 
§ 53, 356 (5th ed. 1984). An actor must bring himself within 
the scope of a definite legal obligation so that it is regarded 
as personal to him. As Prosser notes, "negligence in the air, 
so to speak, will not do." .Id. at 357 (citing Pollock, Law of 
Torts 468 (13th ed. 1920) ("negligence does not exist in the 
abstract, it contemplates a legal duty owing from one party to 
another"); Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376, 379 (10th Cir. 1979) 
(Doctor's countersuit alleging that earlier malpractice suit 
was frivolous; held that patient's lawyer owed no duty to 
doctor)). 
2. The Existence of a Duty is a Question to be Decided as 
a Matter of Law - It has long been established that the 
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existence of a duty is a question to be decided by the court.4 
See, e.g., Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76, 78 (Utah 1977); Hughes 
v. Housely, 599 P.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Utah 1979). This means 
that the court must decide: 
Whether, upon the facts in evidence, such a relation 
exists between the parties that the community will 
impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of 
the other - or, more simply, whether the interest of 
the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled 
to a legal protection at the hands of the defendant. 
This is entirely a question of law, to be determined 
by reference to the body of statutes, rules, prin-
ciples and precedents which makes up the law; it must 
be determined only by the court. It is no part of the 
province of the jury to decide whether a manufacturer 
of goods is under any obligation for the safety of the 
ultimate consumer, or whether the Long Island Railroad 
is required to protect Mrs. Palsgraf from fireworks 
explosions. 
W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 37, 206 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis 
added). 
4In his brief, Mr. Conger cites the cases of Apache Tank Lines, 
Inc. v. Chaney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985) and Williams v. Melby, 
699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) for the proposition that negligence 
actions ordinarily present questions of fact to be resolved by 
the fact finder and that summary judgment in negligence cases 
should be granted with great caution. Those cases accurately 
state the law but are misapplied in this case. In both cases, 
the Court presumed the existence of a legal duty and the 
Supreme Court reversed the district courts on the factual 
issues of breach of duty, reasonableness of conduct and proxi-
mate cause. Neither of those cases addresses the question of 
whether a duty in fact arose and neither case stands for the 
proposition that the fact finder appropriately decides the 
question of duty. Although issues of breach of duty, proximate 
cause, foreseeability and reasonableness of conduct ordinarily 
present questions of fact to be resolved by the fact finder, 
those issues presume the existence of a legal duty. The 
question of duty is within the exclusive province of the court. 
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As the court in Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Bd., 146 Ariz. 
352, 706 P.2d 364, 368 (1985) stated: 
The question of duty is decided by the court. The 
question is whether the relationship of the party was 
such that the defendant was under an obligation to use 
some care to avoid or prevent injury to the plain-
tiff. If the answer is no, the defendant is not 
liable even though he may have acted negligently in 
light of the foreseeable risks. 
Id. (citing W. Prosser & W. Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on 
Torts § 53, at 356-59 (5th ed. 1984); Keckonen v. Robles, 146 
Ariz. 268, 705 P.2d 945 (1985)). 
3. No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists on the 
Question of Duty - On pages 12-17 of Appellant's Brief, Mr. 
Conger asserts that the District Court should have allowed the 
question of the existence of a duty to have gone to the jury 
because of the facts set forth in Appellant's Brief.5 For 
5
 In his attempt to show that a fact question exists on the 
issue of duty, Mr. Conger cites Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 328B, Comment on Clause (b). Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10. 
The example given under Section 328B is the question of what 
duty a possessor of land owes to a trespasser. In the area of 
landowner liability, the landowner's duty may depend on whether 
he was aware of the trespasser. A court viewing that factual 
situation in a light most favorable to the plaintiff on a 
Motion for Summary Judgment would assume that the trespasser 
had been discovered. Based on that view of the facts, then, 
the court could proceed to decide whether the possessor owed 
the trespasser a duty. In that limited circumstance, a finder 
of fact resolves the factual question. However, it is the 
court's exclusive province to decide whether a duty exists 
based on those facts. As it is shown herein, no such factual 
disputes existed. The trial court had the facts before it and 
determined that given those facts in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger no duty. 
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purposes of the District Court's determination of whether a 
duty existed, the District Court viewed the facts set forth in 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Tel-Tech's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Mr. Eilers' Affidavit in the light most 
favorable to Mr. Conger. (See R. 349-352.) Given the plain-
tiff's view of the facts, which Mr. Conger reiterates in his 
Brief, the District Court determined that Tel-Tech owed Mr. 
Conger no duty. No dispute existed with respect to those facts 
for purposes of the Summary Judgment Motion. A review of 
Appellant's Brief shows that Mr. Conger simply disagrees with 
the District Court's determination of no duty and contends that 
the facts indeed show that Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger a duty. 
Mr. Conger has presented no facts here that were not also 
before the District Court. As will be shown in paragraph B 
below, the District Court correctly ruled that Tel-Tech owed 
Mr. Conger no duty. 
It should be noted at this point that the factual issues 
with which Mr. Conger is preoccupied entirely miss the point 
and confuse the concept of duty with the concepts of breach, 
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foreseeability,6 proximate causation and reasonableness of 
conduct. The case of Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Bd., 146 Ariz. 
352, 706 P.2d 364, 367 (1985), explains that those concepts are 
separate but are easily confused. That case involved the ques-
tion of whether the State of Arizona had a duty to take reason-
able precaution to avoid injury to invitees in a recreational 
area. The court stated: 
We have previously explained that we disapprove of 
attempts to equate the concept of duty with specific 
details of conduct. Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 
Ariz. 50, 52, 691 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1984). We there 
approved Dean Prosser's postulate that it is "better 
to reserve 'duty' for the problem of the relation 
between individuals which imposes upon one a legal 
obligation for the benefit of another . . . M . . . 
We again point out that the existence of a duty is not 
to be confused with details of the standard of con-
duct. This incorrectly leads to attempts to decide on 
a general basis whether a defendant has a "duty" to 
post warning signs, . . . . These details of conduct 
bear upon the issue of whether the defendant who does 
have a duty has breached the applicable standard of 
6On page 17 of Appellant's Brief, Mr. Conger states that 
foreseeability of harm is a question of fact and he cites 
several cases which support that proposition, including cases 
which state that a person's negligence is not superseded by 
another's negligence if the subsequent negligence is foresee-
able. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-18. Once again, Appellant 
correctly states Utah law but misapplies the law to this case. 
Those cases assume the existence of a duty. Where such a duty 
exists and a person breaches that duty, his negligence is not 
superseded by another's negligence if the subsequent negligence 
is foreseeable. However, where the first actor owed no legal 
duty, the court never reaches the question of whether a breach 
of duty is superseded by another's negligence. Mr. Conger 
simply disagrees with the District Court's decision that the 
duty was upon Meadow Gold to use the equipment safely and that 
Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger no duty. 
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care and not whether such a standard of care exists in 
the first instance. . . . 
The question is whether the relationship of the 
parties was such that the defendant was under an obli-
gation to use some care to avoid or prevent injury to 
the plaintiff. If the answer is no, the defendant is 
not liable even though he may have acted negligently 
in light of the foreseeable risks. . . . In the 
context of this case, therefore, the concept of duty 
is not a question of whether the danger was natural, 
artificial, obvious, or whether the defendant should 
have searched for, warned of, or removed the danger or 
had taken any other particular action. The question 
is whether defendant was responsible to take any 
precaution for the safety of [plaintiff] or other 
invitees. Would the State have been liable even if 
the park ranger, knowing of the hazard, had sat on the 
rock, watched [plaintiff] get ready to dive and said 
nothing? Those who would answer that question in the 
negative find no duty. To those who would answer 
affirmatively . . . the question is was there a breach 
of the duty? 
706 P.2d at 367-68 (citations omitted). 
Mr. Conger sets forth numerous facts which attempt to equate 
the concept of duty with specific details of conduct or a 
standard of care that he thinks Tel-Tech was under. A careful 
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review of the facts7 reveals that those facts do not go to the 
question of whether a duty arose but presume the existence of a 
duty and go to questions of breach, foreseeability, standard of 
care, proximate cause and reasonableness of conduct. For exam-
ple, Mr. Eilers' Affidavit8 may well attempt to controvert 
facts in the record on the question of whether Tel-Tech acted 
reasonably, whether it was foreseeable that employees would 
7Mr. Conger contends that fact questions exist with respect to 
whether Tel-Tec owed Mr. Conger a duty. As is explained in the 
text, those facts, in reality, do not go to the question of 
whether Tel-Tec owed Mr. Conger a duty, but rather presumed the 
existence of a duty and addressed the subsequent questions of 
fact typical of most negligence actions. Those facts are 
presented in Mr. Eihlers' Affidavit (R. 234-237), and in 
Appellant's Brief at 3-7, with some apparent poetic license. 
8On page 14 of Appellant's Brief, Mr. Conger cites the case of 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) as a case similar 
to the one now before the Court wherein the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed a summary judgment. Once again, Mr. Conger correctly 
states the law but misapplies it in this case. In Williams, an 
architect produced an affidavit in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment. The affidavit alleged facts which supported 
a conclusion that a third story window in an apartment was 
negligently designed, constructed, or maintained and created an 
unreasonable risk to occupants' safety. The Court addressed 
the question of the adequacy and appropriateness of the 
affidavit separately from the question of whether a landlord 
owes a tenant a duty. Once the Court concluded that the 
landlord owed a duty of reasonable care to the tenant, the 
Court concluded that the affidavit presented a sufficient 
factual controversy on the question of whether that duty had 
been breached. The same reasoning was followed in the case of 
Becker v. IRM Corp., 144 Cal. App. 3rd 321, 192 Cal. Rptr. 570 
(1983), vacated by 38 Cal. 3d 545, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal Rptr. 
213 (1985), also cited by Appellant. The affidavits may well 
attempt to create factual disputes on the issues of breach of a 
duty and proximate cause, but the affidavits do not and cannot 
go to the issue of the existence of a duty. 
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walk on top of a tanker truck, whether it was foreseeable that 
a person could slip and fall from the top of a tanker trailer 
and whether Mr. Eilers warns his customers of what he fore-
sees. None of those facts puts into controversy the relation 
of the parties or the existence of a duty. Mr. Eilers is not a 
legal expert and cannot testify as to the existence or nonexis-
tence of a duty. Mr. Conger also contends that the jury should 
have decided whether a duty existed by showing that Tel-Tech 
could have installed a walk protection or could have warned 
Meadow Gold of the hazards. Again, those facts presume the 
existence of a duty and address the standard of care poten-
tially appropriate if a duty exists. 
B. The District Court Correctly Held that Tel-Tech did 
not owe Mr. Conger a Duty. 
In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Daniels viewed the facts 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Conger presumes that 
the District Court viewed the facts which were before it, which 
facts also are before this Court, as though plaintiff's version 
of those facts were true. Taking plaintiff's version of the 
facts as true, the District Court found that Tel-Tech owed Mr. 
Conger no duty. Judge Daniels stated as follows: 
The issue is one of duty; the question is whether one 
who installs or rebuilds equipment has a duty to 
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install, or at least recommend additional safety 
devices which make the equipment safer to use in 
various applications.9 
(R. at 350). Judge Daniels found that there were two important 
competing policies in balance: M[T]he right of the injured 
workman to recover, when he really had no control over the 
environment in which the truck was to be used; and the right of 
a contractor to perform work requested without making further 
inquiry as to the specific use, application and environment in 
which the object is to be used." (R. at 351-52.). On balance, 
the District Court followed the majority in Spangler v. Kranco, 
Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973). For the reasons set forth 
in the District Court's Memorandum Decision and for additional 
reasons set forth herein, the District Court correctly ruled 
that Tel-Tech owed Mr. Conger no duty. 
1. Tel-Tech was not Obligated to Warn Meadow Gold of 
the Necessity of Walkway Protection - Assuming that the lack of 
a walkway or walkway protection constituted a dangerous condi-
tion, Tel-Tech was not obligated to warn Meadow Gold of the 
necessity of their installation. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, referenced in Appellant's Brief at 12-13, does not spe-
cifically address the issue of whether an independent contrac-
tor, such as Tel-Tech, is required to exercise reasonable care 
9Mr. Conger did not controvert the testimony of Tel-Tech 
employees in which they stated that Tel-Tech is not in the 
business of installing safety features on tanker trailers and 
does not have the technical resources to make such installation. 
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to inform his employer of a dangerous condition which he is not 
employed to repair but discovers in the course of making an 
installation, and of which the employer is not aware. Section 
403 of the Restatement states that an independent contractor who 
makes, rebuilds, or repairs a chattel for another and turns it 
over to another, knowing or having reason to know that his work 
has made it dangerous for the use for which it is turned over, 
is subject to the same liability as if he supplied the chattel. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 403 (1965). The liability of a 
Supplier of Chattels is set forth in Restatement, Section 388. 10 
1
°At page 13 of his Brief, Mr. Conger states that Section 392 
of the Restatement sets forth the liability of a supplier of 
chattels. A careful review of Section 392 with its comment a 
reveals that that section deals solely with the liability of a 
supplier of chattels "for another's use . . . [where] the use 
is one in which the supplier has a business interest." Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 392 and Comment a (1965). Evidence of 
such an interest does not exist in the record. 
Section 388 states: 
Chattel known to be dangerous for intended use. One who 
supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for 
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the 
supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent 
of the other or to be endangered by its probable use for 
physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the man-
ner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, 
if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to know that the 
chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for 
which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that 
those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize 
its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise reason-
able care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of 
the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965). 
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The $178.50 installation of spray balls was a specialized 
service requested of Tel-Tech which did not constitute making, 
rebuilding or repairing the milk tanker trailer. The work 
Tel-Tech performed did not, of itself, make the use of the 
spray balls dangerous. As noted by the District Court, the 
"use of the spray balls did not make the tanker any more or 
less dangerous than it was before. It was the application of 
the truck with its spray balls, i.e., walking on top of the 
truck that created the danger." Additionally, the advisors to 
the Restatement expressed "no opinion that a contractor who 
fails to exercise reasonable care to inform his employer of a 
dangerous condition, which he is not employed to repair, but 
which he discovers in the course of making the repairs agreed 
upon and of which he realizes that his employer is unaware, may 
not be subject to the liability stated in this section." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 403, Caveat (1965). 
One of the few cases to address the Caveat under Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 403 (1965) is Ayala v. V & O Press 
Co., 126 A.2d 229, 512 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1987). In Ayala, as 
opposed to Tel-Tech's installation of spray balls, the defen-
dant's action clearly constituted a repair as set forth in 
Section 403 of the Restatement. There the court addressed the 
issue of "whether a party who is retained to perform a specific 
repair with respect to a certain machine, and who performs that 
repair work without flaw, may be liable for damages upon the 
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theory that he negligently failed to warn the owner of the 
machine of a design defect inherent in the machine." 512 
N.Y.S.2d at 705. In 1967, the plaintiffs employer requested 
defendant to replace various parts missing from a press, includ-
ing a sweep guard. Prior to the accident, the guard had been 
removed and was nowhere in the area of the press. The plain-
tiff nonetheless proceeded to use the machine and at one point 
the ram descended without warning, resulting in injuries to the 
plaintiffs hand. The evidence showed that the agreement for 
the repair was a one-time agreement and did not include routine 
or systematic maintenance of the press. The defendant had 
performed that service which the plaintiff's employer had 
requested. The parts installed by defendant were not shown to 
be defective. The court acknowledged the Caveat under Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 403 where the American Law Institute 
expressed no opinion on whether a repairer, who was aware of 
the existence of a design defect and of a mechanism which would 
have prevented the accident but fails to advise the employer of 
the advisability of using such a device, has a duty to use due 
diligence in informing the owner of the product of the design 
defect and/or the mechanism which would prevent foreseeable 
accidents. The court ruled that such allegations, taken in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, do not establish a prima 
facie case under either a strict products liability or a 
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negligence theory. The court found that the critical factor 
which weighed against the imposition of liability for negli-
gence was the absence of any proof that the defendant had 
agreed to provide systematic maintenance of the press. "[A] 
single service call would be insufficient to establish the sort 
of contact with the product owner needed to trigger a duty to 
warn . . . ." .1(3. at 709. The court stated: 
To hold otherwise would be to expose to liability 
every contractor who, over the lifetime of a product, 
repairs it in even the slightest way, simply upon the 
premise that the contractor ought to have warned of a 
dangerous condition inherent in the product's design 
for which he was in no way responsible. We do not 
choose to expand the scope of products liability to 
such an unwarranted degree. 
id. 
Installation of the spray balls, even if considered a 
repair of the tanker, did not change the design of the tanker 
and did not necessitate that someone walk on top of the 
tanker. Two reasonable means of access to the spray balls 
existed which did not require walking on top of the tanker. As 
Judge Daniels noted, it was only after Meadow Gold and plain-
tiff accessed the spray balls in an unreasonable manner, which 
plaintiff and his employer knew to be unreasonable, that the 
tanker became dangerous. Additionally, the installation of the 
spray balls was a one-time event and there is no evidence that 
Tel-Tech agreed to provide systematic maintenance of the spray 
balls or the tanker. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has focused on the duty of a sup-
plier of chattels in a case that is markedly distinguishable 
from this case. In DCR, Inc., v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 
(Utah 1983),ll the Utah Supreme Court sets forth the circum-
stances under which a supplier of chattels has a duty to warn. 
Many of those circumstances are noticeably absent from this 
case. In Peak Alarm, in September of 1976, the owner of a 
clothing store contracted with Peak for the installation and 
maintenance of a burglar alarm in the clothing store. On 
December 22, 1979, a burglary occurred at OCR's store resulting 
in an inventory loss of $55,000.00. Peak's alarm system failed 
to detect the burglary. DCR discovered that the alarm system 
had been rendered inoperative prior to the burglary through the 
use of a simple deactivating technique well known to crimi-
nals. Peak was aware of the common use of this technique by 
11
 In Mr. Conger's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend 
and/or For Relief from Judgment Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Mr. Conger argued that the Peak Alarm case 
compelled the District Court to reverse its prior decision in 
which it had granted Tel-Tech's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In Mr. Conger's Motion, he argued that the Peak Alarm case 
established a duty of Tel-Tech to warn Meadow Gold of the 
danger of walking along the top of a stainless steel tanker 
without walkway protection. In Appellant's Brief, however, Mr. 
Conger references the Peak Alarm case only once, see, 
Appellant's Brief, p. 11, and the reference is simply in 
support of the proposition that the existence of a duty may 
depend upon proof of the nature of the relationship of the 
parties. In the case now before the Court, there is no issue 
with respect to the nature of the relationship between the 
parties. 
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criminals and knew of an easy, inexpensive way to protect its 
alarm system against the risk of such deactivation. In 
response to DCR's question as to why Peak had not warned of the 
vulnerability of the system and suggested this simple correc-
tion, Peak replied that the issuance of such a warning to 
customers "would be too time consuming." 
The contract which the parties entered into contained a 
clause fixing liquidated damages at $50.00. The trial court in 
Peak Alarm granted a motion for summary judgment limiting the 
liability of Peak to $50.00 on all causes of action, including 
negligence, strict liability and breach of contract. The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the contractual limitation 
of damages did not apply to a tort duty arising out of the 
contract. The decision, therefore, merely interpreted the 
application of a contractual limitation of liability upon a 
negligence cause of action. Id. at 434. 
There are at least five major differences between the 
instant case and Peak Alarm which support a finding that 
Tel-Tech did not owe Mr. Conger a duty to warn. 
First, the duty imposed in Peak Alarm was based upon the 
contractual relationships between the parties. The duty which 
the court imposed, to warn of a defect, was to warn of a defect 
in the work that Peak Alarm performed. In the instant case, 
there was no defect in Tel-Tech's work and the spray balls 
worked flawlessly. 
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Second, the duty imposed in Peak Alarm arose out of the 
contractual relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. 
Id. at 435. The Court stated in Peak Alarm that: 
In cases where the alleged negligence consists of a 
failure to act, the person injured by another's inac-
tion must demonstrate the existence of some special 
relationship between the parties creating a duty on 
the part of the latter to exercise such due care in 
behalf of the former. Relationships giving rise to 
such a duty include those between carriers and passen-
gers, employers and employees, owners and invitees, 
and parents and children. Similarly, contractual 
relationships for the performance of services imposed 
on each of the contracting parties a general duty of 
due care toward the other, apart from the specific 
obligations expressed in the contract itself. In 
other words, where no contractual relationship or 
other special relationship exists, no duty arises. 
Id. at 435 (emphasis added). In the instant case, there is no 
contractual relationship between Tel-Tech and Mr. Conger. 
Third, in the instant case, the installation of the spray 
balls did not create any danger to the plaintiff until the milk 
tanker was placed in an environment that would allow an 
employee of Meadow Gold to walk on top of the milk tanker. In 
Peak Alarm, Peak was the one who installed the burglar alarm 
system in DCR's store; consequently, there was no question that 
Peak knew of the environment in which the burglar alarm was 
placed. 
Fourth, the actual duty in Peak Alarm arose out of Peak's 
continuing duty under its service and maintenance obligation. 
The court stated: 
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[Defendant Peak's] duty to warn plaintiff [DCR] of the 
vulnerability of its alarm system does not originate 
from any promise contained within the service contract 
itself. Rather, the duty as it exists in this case is 
derived from defendant's general duty of due care 
which accompanies its ongoing contractual relationship 
with plaintiff for service and maintenance of the 
alarm system. Thus, plaintiff's allegation of failure 
to warn provides the basis for a cause of action in 
tort which is entirely separate from any contract-
based which plaintiff might present. 
Id. at 436 (emphasis added). In the instant case, Tel-Tech did 
not contract for any such continuing duty. 
Fifth, the very purpose for which the contract was entered 
in Peak Alarm was to prevent burglaries through an alarm 
system. That purpose was thwarted because of a defect in the 
alarm system itself. In the instant case, the purpose of the 
contract was to install spray balls so that the inside of the 
milk tanker could be cleaned. If Tel-Tech had contracted to 
install walkway protection (which it does not have the tech-
nical means to do), and Mr. Conger had fallen despite the 
existence of the walkway protection because of a defect known 
to the installer which could have been easily remedied, the 
cases may be sufficiently similar to impose a duty. 
2. Tel-Tech had no Duty to Warn Meadow Gold or Mr. Conger 
of an Open and Obvious Hazard - From a practical, policy and 
legal standpoint, Mr. Conger's contention -- that Tel-Tech 
should have warned Meadow Gold that people who walk on top of 
stainless steel milk tanker trailers that have no walkway 
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protection while cleaning them run the risk of slipping and 
falling — is unpersuasive. The law should not encourage 
people to take leave of their common sense or to take risks 
wittingly. A majority of jurisdictions agree with this 
rationale in holding that a supplier of a chattel has no duty 
to warn where a certain use of the chattel creates an obvious 
risk to the user. For example, in the case of Posey v. Clark 
Equip. Co,; 409 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 940 
(1969), the operator of a forklift was injured when he was 
struck by a falling carton. He alleged that the manufacturer 
of the forklift was liable under the doctrine of strict 
liability for failure to warn the operator of a forklift of the 
possibility of danger from falling objects where the forklift 
had no guard protection. Citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402(A), comments i and j, the Posey court stated: 
"But a seller is not required to warn . . . when the 
danger or the potentiality of danger is generally 
known and recognized." "The article sold must be 
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases 
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
community as to its characteristics." 
Sec. 388 of the Restatement is also instructive with 
respect to the duty of a supplier of a chattel to warn 
users where he knows or has reason to know that the 
chattel is dangerous. One element of liability is 
that he "has no reason to believe that those for whose 
use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous 
condition." 
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Comment k on that element says, in part, "However, the 
condition, although readily observable, may be one 
which only persons of special experience would realize 
to be dangerous. In such case, if the supplier, hav-
ing such special experience, knows that the condition 
involves danger and has no reason to believe that 
those who use it will have such special experience as 
will enable them to perceive the danger, he is required 
to inform them of the risk of which he himself knows, 
and which he has no reason to suppose that they will 
realize." 
409 F.2d at 563. The court found as a matter of law that the 
defendant had no duty to warn because it was "not a situation 
where only persons of . . . special experience would realize 
the danger which might befall an unprotected operator when 
working in proximity to high stacks of cartons." Id. at 564. 
See also Ragsdale v. K-Mart Corp., 468 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. App. 
1984) (no duty to warn against putting hands against rotating 
lawn mower blade where danger of rotating blade was open and 
obvious); Stodghill v. Fiat-Allis Constr. Machinery, Inc., 163 
Ga. App. 811, 295 S.E.2d 183 (1982) (no duty to warn of dangers 
associated with hazards involving the lack of a protective 
metal cage surrounding bulldozer driver's seat where the 
machine was without latent defects, its functioning created no 
danger or peril unknown to the user and lack of protective cage 
was an obvious characteristic of the machine that created no 
hidden peril and did not prevent the machine from functioning 
properly for the purpose for which it was designed); Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 388, Comment K to Clause (b) (1965) 
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("It is not necessary for the supplier to inform those for 
whose use the chattel is supplied of a condition which a mere 
casual looking over will disclose") (further discussed infra., 
Footnote 13.) 
Assuming that Tel-Tech, the installer of the $178.50 
cleaning devices is extrapolated to become the supplier of the 
tanker/trailer, Tel-Tech still was under no duty to warn where 
the hazard was open and obvious because the danger associated 
with walking on the crown of a stainless steel tanker while 
cleaning it was within the ordinary knowledge and common sense 
of those who would use the tanker, and a mere casual looking 
over disclosed the condition of which Appellant claims he 
should have been warned. 
3. Tel-Tech did not owe Mr. Conger any Duty to Judge the 
Adequacies of Meadow Gold's Direction - Tel-Tech installed the 
spray balls in accordance with Meadow Gold's directions. 
Tel-Tech was not asked to install any walk protection or walk-
ways, nor was Tel-Tech informed of how Meadow Gold intended to 
obtain access to the spray ball stations. Tel-Tech, therefore, 
was not under any duty to Mr. Conger to insure that Meadow Gold 
would obtain access to the spray ball installations in a non-
negligent manner. The instant case is similar to Paul Mueller 
Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982). 
In that case, the owner contracted with Maxum, the general 
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contractor, for the installation of a whey drying system on the 
owner's premises. The general contractor subcontracted with 
Mueller to construct four large drying cylinders, a drying cham-
ber and other parts of the system and with Dahle to assemble 
and install the system. The owner of the building in which the 
whey drying system was installed sued Mueller and Dahle for 
negligence claiming that they owed a duty to guard the owner 
against economic losses attributable to defects in the product. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected this contention stating as 
follows: 
Assuming, arguendo, that the W.R.H. case established a 
duty of reasonable care on the part of a manufacturer 
to guard against economic loss to users of its product, 
such a duty would not apply to appellants [Mueller and 
Dahle] in the present case. Appellants are not "manu-
facturers" comparable to the manufacturer in the 
W.R.H. case. While the latter manufactured products 
destined for retail sale to unknown and potentially 
inexperienced purchasers, appellants provided their 
products and services to a presumably knowledgeable 
contractor in accordance with detailed contract 
specifications. Appellants in no way concealed the 
alleged defects in the drying chamber from Maxum and 
were in no better position to anticipate possible 
economic consequences of such defects than was Maxum 
itself. Having contracted directly with Maxum and 
knowing of Maxum's close supervision of the entire 
installation process, appellants had reason to expect 
that Maxum would protect respondent's interest by 
observing and obtaining correction of obvious 
defects. The trial court correctly found that Maxum 
bore responsibility for correction of such defects. 
Id. at 1286 (emphasis added). 
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Tel-Tech was in a position similar to that of the subcon-
tractors, Mueller and Dahle, in the Mueller case. Tel-Tech 
installed the spray ball station in accordance with its 
contract with Meadow Gold and with Meadow Gold's request. 
Unlike the Mueller case, however, there were no defects in 
Tel-Tech's work. Tel-Tech reasonably expected Meadow Gold to 
protect the interests of its employees by observing and 
correcting any deficiencies in the design of the milk tanker 
created by Meadow Gold's choice of the one of three obvious 
ways to obtain access to the spray ball station, i.e., to 
install a walkway if Meadow Gold was going to have its 
employees walk on the milk tanker crown rather than utilizing 
either a separate ladder, or as Western Dairy did, a movable 
platform. (Index 633; Depo. of Leonard Telford, p. 20; see 
Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. Waukesha Bearings Corp., 502 F. 
Supp 1163, 1174-75 (E.D. La. 1980). Tel-Tech in no way 
concealed alleged defects and was in no better position to 
anticipate possible or alleged defects than were Meadow Gold 
and Mr. Conger. 
The rule that an independent contractor who follows the 
owner's directions in making repairs or alterations of a 
chattel is not liable for defects in the owner-furnished plans, 
specifications or directions, finds further support in 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 404, Comment a (1965), which 
states in part: 
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[0]ne who employs a contractor to make a chattel for 
him, like one who employs a contractor to erect a 
structure on his premises, (as to which see § 385), 
usually provides not only plans, but also specifi-
cations which often state the material which must be 
used. Indeed, chattels are often made by independent 
contractors from materials furnished by their employ-
ers. In such a case, the contractor is not required 
to sit in judgment on the plans and specifications or 
the materials provided by this employer. The contrac-
tor is not subject to liability if the specified 
design or material turns out to be insufficient to 
make the chattel safe for use, unless it is so 
obviously bad that a competent contractor would rea-
lize that there was a grave chance that his product 
would be dangerously unsafe. 
(Emphasis added). A majority of jurisdictions, including Utah, 
follow this rule. See, e.g. Benson v. Ames, 604 P.2d 927, 929 
(Utah 1979); Leninger v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co., 17 
Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33 (1965); Moon v. Winger Boss Co., 205 
Neb. 292, 287 N.W.2d 430, 433 (1980); Spangler v. Kranco Inc., 
481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973); Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co., 
221 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Ind. 1963). The court in Spangler v. 
Kranco Inc., stated: 
There was no defect in the crane itself. . . . True, 
there were no bell or warning devices, but the reason-
able need for such equipment depended upon the environ-
ment in which it was used by Reynolds . . . 
481 F.2d at 375; see also Marshall v. H. K. Ferguson Co., 623 
F.2d 882, 885 (4th Cir. 1980) ("the evidence showed that the 
machine operated precisely as it was designed to do. 
[Plaintiff's] unfortunate injury was not caused by any defect 
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inherent in the design or construction of the [machine], but 
resulted from the procedure followed by the employees"). 
Likewise, in the instant case, whether walkway protection 
or walkways were needed depended upon the environment in which 
Meadow Gold utilized the milk tanker. There were two other 
alternatives available to Meadow Gold which would not have 
required anyone to walk on the crown of the milk tanker: a 
separate ladder or a swinging platform walkway. 
The alleged negligent defect is in Tel-Tech's failure to 
install walkways or walkway protection (of which Tel-Tech was 
not capable and which fact Mr. Conger has not controverted with 
competent evidence). Tel-Tech is not liable to Mr. Conger 
because Tel-Tech installed the spray balls in accordance with 
Meadow Gold's directions, which did not include any direction 
to install walkway protection or walkways. 
As Judge Daniels stated in his Memorandum Decision: 
This case is similar to, but not precisely identical 
with those cases where an independent contractor per-
forms work in compliance with the owner's plans and 
specifications. These cases uniformly hold that there 
is no liability, unless the plans are so defective 
that they would not be followed by a reasonable 
person. In this case, however, there were no formal 
plans, or specifications. . . . 
I believe that the case cited which is most nearly on 
point is Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th 
Cir. 1973). In that case, Kranco had installed a 
crane properly, but had not installed a bell or warn-
ing device. The court held that there was no duty to 
do so, because the need for the device depended upon 
the environment in which the crane was to be used. 
Similarly, whether a walkway was needed on the milk 
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truck depended upon what equipment Meadow Gold had, 
and what its work rules were. 
The converse view is expressed by Judge Butzner in the 
dissent in the Spangler case. I do not believe that 
any of the Utah cases provide guidance as to which 
approach should be followed. There are two important 
competing policies in balance: the right of the 
injured workman to recover, when he really had no con-
trol over the environment in which the truck was to be 
used; and the right of a contractor to perform work 
requested without making further inquiry as to the 
specific use, application and environment in which the 
object is to be used. I believe that on balance the 
view of the majority in Spangler is correct. A con-
tractor should be allowed to perform the work he is 
asked to perform without imposing a duty upon him to 
investigate the uses as to which the owner will put 
the equipment. So long as he performs his work in a 
workmanlike way, and his work does not the cause the 
equipment to be dangerous, he should not be held lia-
ble if the owner applies the equipment in a dangerous 
way. The duty is upon the owner to use the equipment 
safely. 
(R. 350-52.) 
Judge Daniels* balancing of the competing policies in this 
case and resolution in favor of Tel-Tech are consistent with 
the rationale of the Mueller case cited above. 
POINT II 
IF THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
TEL-TECH OWED MR. CONGER NO DUTY, IT WAS 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
A. Summary Judgment is Appropriate on Questions of Breach 
where no Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist. 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that summary judgment 
is appropriate where the pleadings and other submissions, 
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including depositions, show that no genuine issue as to any 
material fact exists. Even where a fact remains in dispute, 
that fact must be material and must be genuinely controverted. 
See, e.g., Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 
1980); see also Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983) 
("Although the facts and the inferences from the facts properly 
before the court are to be construed in favor of the opponent 
on a motion of summary judgment, the mere existence of issues 
of fact does not preclude summary judgment. The issues of fact 
must be material to the applicable rule of law") (citing Horgan 
v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 1982)). 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has cautioned that summary 
judgment should be carefully scrutinized in negligence cases 
where the facts are disputed, the facts material to the 
applicable rule of law in this case are not in dispute. 
B. Assuming that Tel-Tech was under an Obligation to warn 
Meadow Gold, the Obligation was Discharged by Meadow Gold's and 
Mr. Conger's Knowledge of the Hazard - Even assuming that 
Tel-Tech was under an obligation to warn Meadow Gold, the obli-
gation can be discharged by notice to Meadow Gold. Wissman v. 
General Tire Co. of Philadelphia, 327 Pa. 215, 192 A. 633 
(1932). The notice is not necessary, and the obligation is 
discharged, if the employer is aware of the defect. It is not 
necessary for the independent contractor to inform his employer 
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of something of which he is already aware. Long v. Deere & 
Co., 238 Kan. 766, 715 P.2d 1023, 1029 (1986); Goodbar v. 
Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984), aff'd sub. 
nom., Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985); E. L. 
Shorafa v. Ruprecht, 345 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977); 
Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2nd 462 (Fla. 1959). In Long, the court 
set forth Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
which is the general rule regarding a Supplier's duty to 
warn.12 Referring to Section 388 the Long court stated: 
As with most rules, the above rule requiring a manu-
facturer to warn is not without exception. One such 
exception was recognized in Jones v. Hittle Service, 
Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383, where the court 
stated: "there is no duty to warn of dangers actually 
known to the user of a product, regardless of whether 
the duty rests in negligence or on strict liability." 
219 Kan. 639-40, quoting Garrett v. Nissen Corp., 84 
N.M. 16, 21, 498 P.2d 1359 (1972). (Emphasis added.) 
Long, 715 P.2d at 1029. The Long court further stated: 
It would seem to be an obvious truism to state that 
there is no duty on the part of a manufacturer or 
seller to give a warning of a product-connected danger 
where the person who claims to be entitled to the 
warning actually knows of the danger. The case law 
also clearly supports the view that a person is not 
entitled to be warned about something he already 
knows. Similarly, there is no duty to warn employees 
of the purchaser of a product, where it appears that 
such employees knew of the dangers to which the 
warning would have related. 
Id. (quoting Annot., 76 A.L.R. 2d 9 (1961) (emphasis added)). 
12See Footnote 10, supra. 
-42-
At the time Tel-Tech installed the spray ball stations, 
Donald Dvorak was Meadow Gold's transportation manager and was 
responsible for transportation safety. (Index 640; Depo. of 
Donald Dvorak, pp. 4, 8, 14, 19). At that time, Mr. Dvorak 
considered the installation of a walkway on the milk tanker but 
failed to do anything about it. (Index 640; Depo. of Donald 
Dvorak, p. 20). As noted above, if the owner is aware of the 
defect in a contractor's work and does nothing to correct it, 
the contractor is not liable to a third party injured by the 
defect. Consequently, because Mr. Dvorak knew of the potential 
safety hazard, and failed to do anything about it, any duty 
owed Meadow Gold or Mr. Conger by Tel-Tech was discharged by 
the knowledge. 
Additionally, Mr. Conger's own testimony states that he was 
aware of the hazard, had discussed it with co-employees and had 
asked two of his supervisors about the possibility of install-
ing walkway protection on the tanker. (Index 637; Depo. of 
Robert E. Conger, pp. 66-76). As noted above, "there is no 
duty to warn employees of the purchaser of a product, where it 
appears that such employees knew of the danger to which the 
warning would have related." Mr. Conger argues that based on 
Section 403, Restatement (Second) of Torts, the maker, 
rebuilder or repairer of a chattel who knows or has reason to 
know that his work has made the chattel dangerous for the use 
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for which it is turned over is subject to the same liability as 
if he supplied the chattel. Mr. Conger then contends that the 
duty applicable to suppliers of chattels attaches.13 However, 
the obvious truism is that where both Meadow Gold (Donald 
Dvorak, Mr. Petersen and Mr. Keating) and Mr. Conger himself 
actually knew of the danger but failed to anything about it, 
any duty to warn of the danger was discharged. 
13See Footnote 10, supra. Comment k to Clause (b) to Section 
388, the duty applicable to suppliers of chattels, states: 
When warning of defects unnecessary. One who supplies a 
chattel to others to use for any purpose is under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous 
character insofar as it is known to him, or of facts which, 
to his knowledge, make is likely to be dangerous, if but 
only if, he has no reason to expect that those for whose 
use the chattel is supplied will discover its condition and 
realize the danger involved. It is not necessary for the 
supplier to inform those for whose use the chattel is 
supplied of a condition which a mere casual looking over 
will disclose, unless the circumstances under which the 
chattel is supplied are such as to make it likely that even 
so casual an inspection will not be made. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, Comment k to Clause (b) 
(1965). In other words, no duty to warn exists where the 
supplier had reason to expect that the users of the chattel 
would discover its condition and realize the danger involved 
from a casual inspection of the chattel. The facts show that 
not only did Tel-Tech have reason to expect that the users of 
the chattel would discover its condition and realize the danger 
involved, Meadow Gold and Mr. Conger himself did discover its 
condition and realized the danger involved in walking along the 
top of the milk tanker without walkway protection. 
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CONCLUSION 
The facts of this case show that Meadow Gold asked Tel-Tech 
to make a relatively inexpensive installation of cleaning equip-
ment on the tanker trailer. Meadow Gold and Mr. Conger knew of 
how the spray ball station would be accessed and knew of the 
danger in selecting that alternative. Yet, in the face of 
those known dangers, Meadow Gold and Mr. Conger continued. To 
impose a duty on Tel-Tech where Meadow Gold had requested only 
the installation of spray balls, knew of the dangers and yet 
selected the most unreasonable means to access the spray balls 
would impose absolute liability on Tel-Tech. Such an unreason-
able request should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this /^ Af) day of August, 1987. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
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